- Introduction: five first lessons
- Putting yourselves into other people's shoes
- Iterative deletion and the median-voter theorem
- Best responses in soccer and business partnerships
- Nash equilibrium: bad fashion and bank runs
- Nash equilibrium: dating and Cournot
- Nash equilibrium: shopping, standing and voting on a line
- Nash equilibrium: location, segregation and randomization
- Mixed strategies in theory and tennis
- Mixed strategies in baseball, dating and paying your taxes
- Evolutionary stability: cooperation, mutation, and equilibrium
- Evolutionary stability: social convention, aggression, and cycles
- Sequential games: moral hazard, incentives, and hungry lions
- Backward induction: commitment, spies, and first-mover advantages
- Backward induction: chess, strategies, and credible threats
- Backward induction: reputation and duels
- Backward induction: ultimatums and bargaining
- Imperfect information: information sets and sub-game perfection
- Subgame perfect equilibrium: matchmaking and strategic investments
- Subgame perfect equilibrium: wars of attrition
- Repeated games: cooperation vs. the end game
- Repeated games: cheating, punishment, and outsourcing
- Asymmetric information: silence, signaling and suffering education
- Asymmetric information: auctions and the winner's curse
%%
| Yale University. Some rights reserved. All content on this web page is licensed under a Creative Commons License. |
No comments:
Post a Comment